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The complexity of career paths in the 21st century 
has led to a rise in the number of career changes in 
a typical working life. Effective career practitioners, 
therefore, should have a good understanding of the 
process of career choice. One aspect of decision 
making which has attracted attention in the literature 
is the role of the unconscious or gut instinct. Once 
considered best ignored, its potency and value are 
now recognised. Drawing from decision theory, 
cognitive neuroscience and behavioural economics, 
this paper summarises evidence of the most common 
and effective decision making strategies used in career 
choice, and considers the implications for practice.
Introduction
Indecisiveness has been identified as one of the ten 
issues which clients are most likely to bring to career 
practitioners (Gati, Krausz and Osipow, 1996) and it 
is no wonder that clients find career choices difficult 
as evidence shows us that career decisions are 
empirically demanding. Cognitive psychologists have 
identified some features which render one decision 
more challenging than another: difficult decisions 
are those with a large number of alternative options, 
where there is a degree of uncertainty about the 
outcome and where there is significant potential for 
loss if a bad choice is made (Hastie and Dawes, 2010). 
Career decisions often fall into all three of these 
categories, with 37,000 job titles to choose between 
in the UK (ONS, 2010), decisions often being based 
on incomplete and conflicting information (Gati et al, 
1996) and career choice inextricably bound up with 
identity (Ibarra, 1999). 
There is therefore a clear need for information 
and advice on how to make better decisions, to 
ensure that practitioners are fully equipped to offer 
appropriate support to clients who struggle to 
make their choices. Career learning frameworks (for 
example Barnes, Bassot and Chant, 2013; Law and 
Watts, 1977) have long acknowledged the importance 
of decision making in career learning. The factors 
influencing the decision are covered in career theories 
widely – whether those are career interests (Holland, 
1997), drivers, (Schein, 1990), chance events, (Bright 
and Pryor 2005), or life themes (Savickas, 2005), 
and strategies for career decision making have been 
examined through decision making styles and profiles 
(Bimrose and Barnes, 2007; Gati et al, 2010). It is, 
however, something of a paradox that whilst career 
decision making looms large in both career theory 
and practice, the literature provides only a limited 
understanding of the processes underpinning how 
good career decisions are made, and little advice on 
what career practitioners can do to enhance clients’ 
decision making skills.This article seeks to make a start 
on addressing this gap by summarising the existing 
relevant literature and making some initial suggestions 
for practice.
Decision making processes
Scholars have identified two distinct processes through 
which we make decisions. The first is gut instinct (also 
referred to as System 1 reason, experiential reason, 
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or heuristic based reason), which is an unconscious, 
instantaneous and automatic process that relies heavily 
(although not exclusively) on emotion. The gut instinct 
processes almost immeasurable amounts of data in an 
instant and makes use of a series of heuristics or rules 
of thumb to reach a conclusion. The second decision 
making process is conscious rationality, (also known 
as System 2 or rule based reason) which, by contrast, 
is a conscious and deliberate strategy: individuals 
are in control of the process and can articulate the 
steps involved in reaching the conclusion.  Conscious 
rationality tends to be more comprehensive but 
demands considerably more cognitive effort than gut 
instinct. Researchers continue to debate the exact 
nature of the distinctions between the two systems 
(Mikels, Maglo, Red and Kaplowitz, 2011). For some 
scholars, the essence of the difference lies in whether 
the processing happens in the unconscious (System 
1) or the conscious (System 2). For others, the key 
distinction lies in the role that emotions has on the 
process, which is thought to be far more significant 
in System 1 processing (Evans, 2008). Epstein (1994) 
suggests that the systems differ in how they store 
knowledge, with the System 1 storage being in the 
form of images, and the System 2 storage system based 
on words.
Evidence shows (for example, Kahneman, 2003; 
Stanovich and West, 2000) that decision makers can 
reach different conclusions depending on the system 
used but we should be cautious about generalising 
these results. Much of the research has been 
conducted in artificial settings using experimental 
designs which manipulate participants to use one or 
the other decision making processes (Mikels et al. 
2011) rather than examining real-world decisions. 
Rational decision making
Rational decision theory dominated decision making 
literature for much of the 20th century. Hastie and 
Dawes (2010) sum up the message which emerged 
from traditional decision making research that ‘a 
decision is a good one if it follows the laws of logic 
and probability theory’ (p. 42). A number of different 
rational decision theories have been put forward over 
the last 50 years (Browning, Halcli and Webster, 2000). 
The theories presuppose that behaviour is rational, 
and that when considering what action to take, we 
weigh up the costs and benefits, and make our choices 
based on the behaviour which is most likely to bring 
the highest reward (Homans, 1961). 
A rational approach to decision making has been 
applied directly to the career decision making arena. 
Expected utility theory (a rational decision theory 
which is thought to be particularly effective when 
making probabilistic decisions) has been identified as a 
useful framework for career choice (Pitz and Harren, 
1980). The expected utility theory of careers advocates 
that an individual should identify the factors which are 
important in a future job (for example, salary, distance 
from home, interesting colleagues) and should score 
each possible career alternative based on the extent 
to which each job would fulfil each criteria.  Scores 
could then be weighted based on how important a 
particular factor is, and on the basis of the chances of 
one’s success in each field.  Gati (1986) proposed the 
sequential elimination model, an extension of expected 
utility theory, in which options are gradually narrowed 
down, factor by factor: an individual might first rule 
out all the career options which pay below a certain 
salary, might then dismiss all those which are more 
than five miles from home and would final choose the 
one which would have most interesting colleagues. 
Problems with rational decision 
theories
Rational decision theories have intuitive appeal, but 
two areas raise doubts about their suitability for 
career practice. 
The first argument lies in the relationship between 
normative and descriptive approaches to theory. 
Rational decision theories are normative, in that 
they seek to provide a model for good decision 
making: they explain how decisions ought to be made. 
Descriptive theories, in contrast, simply describe how 
decisions are made, with no judgement or advice 
on the effectiveness of these processes. Descriptive 
approaches have generated empirical evidence which 
suggests that as decision-makers, we are likely to rely 
on gut instinct rather than conscious logic in most 
situations, as Phillips laments  (1997: 278), ‘those who 
have considered what actually happens in the decision-
making process have offered the nearly unanimous 
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not reflect the decider’s reality’, yet advice on how to 
make decisions has been almost exclusively rational. 
But does this matter to us in practice? Is it 
problematic that the strategies we advise clients to 
use are different from those which they have chosen 
to use themselves? It could be argued that how people 
actually make decision should have no bearing on 
career practice – as long as we know the best way to 
make a decision, we can share that information with 
clients and encourage them to follow this process. 
The risk however is that this approach would lead 
to clients who have nearly reached an instinctive 
decision being told by a career practitioner to ignore 
the progress that they have already made and start 
again from scratch using a different decision making 
process. This feels like a far more onerous task, both 
for the client, who loses the understanding they have 
already gained, and has to start over, and for the 
career practitioner who needs to find a way to explain 
and teach a whole new decision making process. 
A more pragmatic approach to career practice, 
which would allow clients to capitalise on their 
existing thinking is to identify successful real-world 
mechanisms for making career decisions, and then use 
this understanding to support clients whose decision 
processes have not been successful. Clients who have 
nearly reached a decision through their intuition in 
this case would then be supported to extend their 
existing strategies to reach a conclusion. This approach 
too could lead to clients honing their already fairly 
sophisticated decision making expertise, rather than 
having to learn a brand new decision making strategy. 
The second challenge to the supremacy of rational 
decision making is that it is often found to be less 
effective than heuristic based unconscious reason, 
with evidence gleaned from a wide range of contexts 
showing that in particular situations intuition can out-
perform conscious logic time after time. In fact, Hastie 
and Dawes (2010:232) conclude that ‘we cannot cite 
any research based proofs that deliberate choice habits 
are better in practical affairs than going with your gut 
intuitions’. In summary, evidence suggests that System 
2 is neither the most common nor necessarily the 
most effective way to make decisions. 
Although beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to acknowledge the cultural dimension on 
this discussion. The literature covered here is almost 
exclusively drawn from the west, examining the 
decision making processes of western participants. 
Individuals from other cultures may be more likely to 
rely on different processes for their choices.
Gut instinct
The gut instinct is an unconscious process which 
makes automatic, instantaneous judgements. The gut 
instinct makes use of a number of heuristics or rules 
of thumb which serve as short cuts to help us make 
reasonably good decisions (Gigernezer, Todd, and the 
ABC Research Group, 1999). These heuristics are 
efficient, in that they use minimal cognitive effort 
and are very fast, and so are useful in most everyday 
decision making. Researchers estimate that where the 
conscious can process 2 – 3 bits of information per 
second, the unconscious can do 11,200,000 bits per 
second (Dijkstehuis et al, 2006). Heuristics are based 
on primitive mental processes and are developed 
over time based on the trial and error of our own 
experiences, through vicarious learning and via direct 
instruction (Cohen et al, 1990). 
Emotions have been shown to play a significant role 
in instinctive decisions (Le Doux, 1996; Rolls, 1999; 
Slovic et al, 2002; Zajonc, 1980). Neuroscience has 
furnished us with a suggestion of the mechanism at 
play (Ito and Cacciopo, 1999) proposing that a stimulus 
triggers a hormonal response: dopamine mediates a 
positive reaction and acetylcholine mediates a negative 
reaction. This hormonal response is global (is it is not 
nuanced and does not acknowledge areas of strength 
and weakness) producing a general impression of the 
stimulus (pleasant or unpleasant), and the response is 
unconscious and instantaneous. 
The unconscious process is not voluntary and so is 
inescapable – we cannot choose not to respond in 
this way, and it is not verbally explicit so can be hard 
to articulate (Kahnemann, 2003). One impact of the 
immediacy of the unconscious response is that our gut 
instinct can reach a conclusion before the conscious 
mind has even begun to organise and recall the 
relevant information (Zajonc, 1980). This explains the 
experience, familiar to many of us, of knowing that we 
enjoyed a book, or film, but being unable to recollect 
a single detail of the plot. This may also explain how 
‘The heart has its reasons that reason knows nothing of’…
A
rticles
|31October 2015, Issue 35
an individual can have a sense that they wouldn’t like 
a particular occupation without necessarily being able 
to identify any of the core duties which the job might 
entail.
Evidence suggests that the gut instinct is at least as 
good a decision making mechanism as rational decision 
making most of the time (Gigernezer, et al1999; 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993) and has been 
shown to be particularly effective in making decisions 
where there is too much information, no definitive 
right answer, and where creativity is needed to find a 
solution (Gigerenzer et al, 1999). It is useful to reflect 
that these factors appertain to many career decisions. 
Problems with the gut instinct
A side effect of the reliance on heuristics for decision 
making is that the gut instinct is subject to a range 
of biases and errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Decision makers relying on their instincts tend to 
ignore sample sizes, they give a disproportionate 
significance to recent and out of the ordinary 
information, and use heuristics which are subject 
to biases such as context (Huber and Puto, 1983), 
order effects, (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and framing 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Unconscious decisions are 
relatively intractable – even when new evidence comes 
to light, instinct often doesn’t change to reflect the 
new information (Zajonc, 1980). Experts in a wide 
range of fields have been shown to rely on System 1 
reasoning, which may suggest that instinct is a more 
highly advanced decision making mechanism, but the 
effectiveness of these expert decisions relies on many 
hours of practice (Gigerenzer, 2007).
How we actually make 
decisions
I have explained the two systems above as though they 
are entirely separate systems but inevitably, the reality 
is not quite as neat. 
In the early days of decision theory, System 1 
heuristics were thought of as response errors which 
should be corrected (Cohen, 1981), and later as side 
effects to normal cognition (Rumelhart, 1984). More 
recently compelling evidence has emerged on the 
value of instinct as a complement to tradition models 
(Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Damasio, 1994). The current 
direction of thinking is that ‘no task is “process pure”’ 
(Ferreira et al, 2006) and that all decisions will rely 
on both systems of decision making combining the 
rational conscious logic of System 2 with the intuition 
of System 1. 
The exact nature of the associations between the two 
processes is still under debate, but whilst a range of 
dual process models depict different relationships (for 
example, Griffin, Gonzalez and Varey, 2001; Stanovich 
and West, 2000) the potency of the gut instinct is 
generally accepted.
Some suggest that System 2 monitors the quality of 
mental operations generated by System 1 (Gilbert, 
2002), although acknowledge that it doesn’t always 
do it very well (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). 
Motivated reasoning (Brownstein, 2003) describes a 
process of post hoc rationality, in which the conscious 
mind provides a rational justification for the decision 
which the unconscious gut instinct has already made. 
Zajonc, (1980:155) neatly illustrates this with the story 
of an attempt to use rational logic to decide which 
job to take: ‘I get half way through my…balance sheet 
and say “Oh hell, it’s not coming out right. I have to 
find a way to get some pluses over on the other side.”’ 
When the rules governing instinct and conscious 
reason conflict, and an individual is faced with choosing 
between a System 2  outcome which they know is 
rational, or a System 1 option which they know is not, 
their gut instinct will often dominate (Denes-Raj and 
Epstein, 1994).
There is some evidence of the processes which are 
chosen in different decision making contexts. Hastie 
and Dawes (2010) identify ten common decision 
making strategies, ranging from the instinctive 
‘recognition heuristic’ (where an individual chooses 
the first alternative that they recognise) through to the 
rational ‘additive linear model’ (in which each attribute 
for each option is weighted by their importance to 
the current goal, and the weighted values are all added 
up to reveal the right choice). In general, strategies 
relying on conscious System 2 logic require more 
cognitive effort, but provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of the options. Strategies relying on the 
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but are less likely to take all factors or options into 
account. It seems that decision makers exhibit a fairly 
sophisticated ‘meta-rationality’ in choosing which 
decision making strategies they use (Hastie and Dawes, 
ibid).  The more thorough (i.e. System 2) decision 
making strategies tend to be used for more important 
decisions, except in circumstances where information 
is too plentiful or incomplete, or where outcomes are 
not predictable. In these cases System 1 logic tends to 
dominate. 
Career decisions
The evidence I have summarised above is principally 
drawn from decision theory, neuroscience and 
behavioural economics, but the received wisdom 
of relying on rational decision making processes 
has been echoed within the career decision making 
arena (for example, Holland, 1985; Super, 1980). 
Krieshok (2009:278) affirms that ‘the representation 
of vocational introspection as a conscious and wilful 
process remains the dominant paradigm’. But empirical 
evidence from the career sphere, and inferences which 
we can reasonably make from the broader decision 
making field are raising questions around these 
assumptions in career decision making too.
Much of the evidence garnered from the field of career 
decision making suggests that intuitive decision styles 
dominate career choice either as the acknowledged 
decision making process, or via the process of 
motivated reasoning described above, but there is 
some evidence that a combination of conscious and 
unconscious processes might lead to the best career 
decisions.
Blustein and Strohmer (1987) conducted research 
which highlights that students do not always use 
rational approaches when considering career options. 
In these studies, participants were asked to assess 
the personal attributes required for a range of 
occupations. When examining jobs in occupational 
areas which they were considering for their own 
future careers, participants tended to emphasise the 
need for personal attributes which they felt they 
themselves possessed; when analysing occupations 
they were not intending to pursue, participants were 
more likely to stress the need for personal qualities 
they did not possess. Participants thus highlighted how 
well-matched they were to the jobs they were already 
contemplating, and how unsuitable they would be for 
those positions which they had previously disregarded. 
These results echo Soelberg’s (1967) findings that 
whilst participants reported that they were using 
rational techniques for career decision making, in 
reality, they were relying on intuitive approaches and 
Greenbank (2009:259) who found that ‘students were 
not adopting a rational/comprehensive approach’ when 
it came to decisions about their next steps.
Evidence of links between decision making processes 
and career outcomes are in very short supply, but 
one study, (Singh and Greenhaus, 2004) does indicate 
that when the two systems are combined, decision 
makers are more likely to make optimal decisions. 
Their study matched up decision making processes 
with the degree of person-job fit that career changers 
experienced in their new jobs and found that 
participants who made use of both conscious and 
unconscious decision processes were more likely to 
find themselves with higher degrees of person-job fit.
In addition to the lessons learned from career 
decision making theory research, we can make some 
inferences from the evidence from the broader 
discipline of decision theory. Hastie and Dawes 
(2010) conclude that instinctive approaches are 
fruitful in non-optimal decision making conditions of 
all sorts: ‘these efficient but non-optimal strategies 
may even be adaptively optimal in noisy, stressful 
and unforgiving environments’ (2010:228). The non-
optimal conditions they propose apply to many, if not 
most career decisions – the information is too vast 
or is incomplete, the outcome uncertain and the time 
for decision making limited, supporting the case to 
incorporate heuristic reason in career choice.
Evidence too exists (Dijkstehuis et al, 2006) that when 
the decisions are between multi-attribute options (i.e. 
a range of options which don’t all have the same set of 
features, such as might be faced when comparing two 
jobs in different industries) the unconscious manages 
better because of its remarkable computational power. 
Their supposition is that for any complex intellectual 
task, the unconscious should out-perform the 
conscious.  
‘The heart has its reasons that reason knows nothing of’…
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Implications for practice
The research into the processes underpinning career 
decision making is limited, and our understanding of 
how good career decisions are made, still more so. But 
even the incomplete grasp we have serves to highlight 
that some of the conventions that have long been 
held true in career practice, should be questioned. I 
highlight here six common practices or assumptions 
which current evidence suggests could be questioned.
1. We don’t need to teach decision making 
processes.  As I mentioned above, the decision 
making element of career learning programmes 
tends to focus on the factors which contribute to 
career decisions, and rarely on the skills needed 
to hone the cognitive processes required. The 
evidence presented in the article could indicate 
that the best decisions are made through the gut 
instinct of skilled decision makers. One useful 
focus for career education could be to find ways 
to enhance decision making powers of our clients.
2. Rational decisions are likely to be better 
ones. The evidence illustrates clearly that the gut 
instinct has the potential to make at the very least, 
a positive contribution to effective career decision 
making. Understanding that instinctive judgements 
have an important contribution to make to the 
career decision making process could lead to 
practitioners encouraging clients to make good 
use of their unconscious insights.
3. It is possible to ignore the gut instinct. Our 
intuition is automatic and instantaneous and as 
a consequence we can’t control it and we can’t 
switch it off. Acknowledging the inevitability 
of clients’ intuitive responses might lead to 
insightful career conversations, as a focus on 
the unconscious process could allow clients 
to articulate and evaluate the quality of their 
instinctive reason.
4. Information is a pre-requisite to opinion. 
Most career education assumes that information 
is the starting point for any career decision. 
As we saw above, we can have unconscious 
reactions to stimulus that we don’t think we 
know anything about. Practitioners might usefully 
open conversations by trying to ascertain clients’ 
emotional reactions to particular occupations, 
before information is introduced.
5. Our conscious minds have an accurate 
understanding of the decision making 
processes at play. Research into motivated 
reasoning illustrates that our conscious minds are 
not always fully cognisant of the processes at play, 
attributing decisions made by System 1 reasoning 
to System 2 logic. Career practitioners could 
initiate fruitful conversations about their intuitive 
and emotional reasons even with clients who 
articulate sound rational reasons for their choices. 
Conclusion
The processes by which we make career decisions 
have been much neglected in literature and, arguably, 
practice. In this article, I have summarised some of the 
relevant research into this arena, and stressed that 
the unconscious processes should not be ignored. The 
application of decision theory to the careers arena 
is very much in its infancy and further research is 
needed to allow us to understand the mechanism at 
play, the consequences of these mechanisms, and the 
implications for practice. The evidence, however, even 
as it stands, can usefully encourage us to question our 
assumptions, and to foreground career decision making 
processes in career conversations. 
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